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PUBLIC INTEREST REPRESENTATION IN
GLOBAL IP POLICY INSTITUTIONS1
Dr. Jeremy Malcolm2
ABSTRACT
This paper compares the institutional and procedural arrangements that a
range of global institutions make for civil society representation and input
into policy development processes on intellectual property issues. The
context for this analysis comes from two sets of norms for multistakeholder public policy development that exist in other regimes of
governance: those of the Aarhus Convention (for environmental matters),
and those of the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (for Internet
governance). These global norms, along with the actual practices of the
institutions involved in global governance of intellectual property rights,
are then contrasted with the proposed new institutional mechanisms for
ACTA, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement. It is found that ACTA
falls short even of the practices of the other institutions analysed, but far
shorter of the ideals promulgated in the Aarhus Convention and the Tunis
Agenda. Whilst the shortcomings of the ACTA negotiation process are
largely to blame for this, an underlying problem is the lack of a normative
framework for civil society representation and participation in intellectual
property policy development.

1

At the time this paper was researched and written, the July 1, 2010 draft of ACTA
was the most recent draft of the text. Any references to ―the most recent text‖ and related
analysis refer to the July 1, 2010 draft. After this paper was submitted for publication, a
new draft of ACTA was leaked on Aug. 25, 2010. This paper may be revised by the author
to reflect changes made by the Aug. 25, 2010 draft text.
2
Project Coordinator for IP and Communications, Consumers International.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most persistent complaints that activists and scholars have
brought against the process of negotiations for an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA) is that there has been insufficient openness to civil
society, by way of transparency3 or public consultation.4
The negotiators have repeatedly denied these charges,5 but in doing so
have sometimes appeared surprised that broader civil society even expects

3 See Emily Ayoob, Recent Development: The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 175 (2010).
4 This has been treated as a ―the responsibility of each ACTA country itself.‖ Mike
Masnick, ACTA Negotiators Respond to Questions about ACTA; More of the Same,
TECHDIRT (June 29, 2010, 12:28 PM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100629/10381810004.shtml. However some of the
negotiating countries that have held their own public consultation meetings (and not all
have) have done so under conditions unfavourable to civil society. See Issa Villarreal,
Concerns About Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), GLOBAL VOICES ONLINE
(Feb. 25, 2010), http://globalvoicesonline.org/2010/02/25/global-concerns-about-anticounterfeiting-trade-agreement-acta/.
5 See Masnick, supra note 4, Monika Emert, European Commission on ACTA:
TRIPS Is Floor Not Ceiling, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (April 22, 2009, 7:18 PM),
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/04/22/european-commission-on-acta-trips-is-floornot-ceiling/.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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to be consulted on this agreement. After all, they suggest, ACTA ―is not
about limiting civil liberties or harassing consumers.‖6
In other contexts, this would seem a rather naïve attitude. For example,
as this paper will show, the importance of accountability of and
transparency in decision-making, and the public's right to be consulted
during the preparation of normative instruments, are quite rudimentary
concepts in both environmental law and in Internet governance.
However, having been raised, the question should be squarely
addressed: since governments (or at least those that are negotiating ACTA)
are the democratically elected representatives of their citizens, what need is
there for civil society to be directly involved in the negotiation and
implementation of an international agreement at all?
The simplest answer is that at the international level, policy-making
suffers from serious democratic deficits. That is to say, with each layer that
representatives are removed from the citizens they represent, their
democratic legitimacy is reduced. The diplomats who represent nation
states in intergovernmental organisations are not directly accountable to
their electorates at home, and nor does their national parliament necessarily
have any opportunity to ratify the decisions they make.7
Indeed, this has been a positive selling point for the countries
negotiating ACTA, in that, according to many commentators, ACTA has
been used as a vehicle for ―policy laundering‖ by allowing controversial
policy changes to be negotiated away from domestic venues, until an
international obligation to implement those changes is in place, at which
time any domestic opposition will come too late.8
Lacking adequate accountability to their citizens through domestic
democratic processes, the policy-making activities of governments within
international institutions can only be legitimized through additional public
accountability at that level. As one scholar puts it:
The reliance on democratic principles and the

6 Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Answer to a Written Question, ACTA Negotiations and
Telecoms Package Principles (Feb. 4, 2010),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-20096094&language=EN.
7 This varies from one country to another, but the United States, for example, is
negotiating ACTA as an ―Executive Agreement‖ that requires only the consent of the
President, not the Congress. See Eddan Katz and Gwen Hinze, The Impact of the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement on the Knowledge Economy: The Accountability of the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative for the Creation of IP Enforcement Norms Through
Executive Trade Agreements, 35 YALE J. INT'L. L. 24 (2009).
8 See David Kravets, Copyright Treaty is Policy Laundering at its Finest, (Nov. 4,
2009, 7:59 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/11/policy-laundering.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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consent of the governed, which legitimize political
decisions in the Western tradition, are of little help in
international affairs. The ―democratic deficit‖ of
international organizations is a commonplace.
Rather, the international lawyer must justify his
authority by the acceptance of the results of his
activity by his audience and addressees, in particular
states, and increasingly non-governmental actors.9

Thus it is here that the place of civil society comes in. Even the United
Nations has acknowledged the importance of civil society's role in
legitimizing policy-making within international institutions. The Cardoso
report on civil society presented to the U.N. General Assembly in 2004
recommended ―that the United Nations can make an important contribution
to strengthening democracy and widening its reach by helping to connect
national democratic processes with international issues and by expanding
roles for civil society in deliberative processes.‖10
It is in this context that institutions in several global governance
domains (or regimes, as they will be termed here)11 have begun to reform
their structures and processes to increase their transparency and
accountability to civil society, and to allow NGOs—that is, the actors who
constitute organised global civil society—greater levels of participation in
policy development.
The next section will briefly describe two sets of norms or principles
that have guided this ongoing process, respectively within the regimes of
international environmental law and Internet governance.

II.

OTHER REGIMES

A. Environmental Law
The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(or Earth Summit) was a major event in which the governments of 172

9 Andreas L. Paulus, From Territoriality to Functionality? Towards a Legal
Methodology of Globalization, in GOVERNANCE AND INT’L LEGAL THEORY 59, 61 (Ige F.
Dekker, et al. ed., 2004).
10 Chair of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations—Civil Society, Report
of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations—Civil Society Relations, 24, U.N. Doc.
A/58/817 (June 11, 2004), available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/376/41/PDF/N0437641.pdf.
11 Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, 36 INT'L ORG., 185 (1982).
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP

5

PIJIP Research Paper No. 2010-06

countries joined with 2,400 NGO representatives to develop several
agreements addressing issues of environmental conservation and climate
change.12
One of these agreements was the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development,13 which relevantly provides
Principle 10. Public participation
Environmental issues are best handled with the
participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant
level. At the national level, each individual shall
have appropriate access to information concerning
the environment that is held by public authorities . . .
and the opportunity to participate in decision-making
processes. States shall facilitate and encourage
public awareness and participation by making
information widely available. Effective access to
judicial and administrative proceedings, including
redress and remedy, shall be provided.
Although non-binding in itself, this declaration formed the basis for the
subsequent binding UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters, otherwise known as the Aarhus Convention.14
The parties to the Aarhus Convention are over forty European and
Central Asian members of the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe (UNECE), including the European Union. The United States,
although a member of the UNECE, is not a party to the Convention. It did,
however, attend the first conference of the parties in 1992 to voice its
exception to the significant role that the Convention accorded to NGOs,
stating that it would ―not regard this regime as precedent.‖15
That said, the Convention is indeed somewhat remarkable. Whereas

12 See STANLEY JOHNSON, THE EARTH SUMMIT: THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCED) (1993).
13 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero,
Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), Annex I (June 13, 1992), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm.
14 See Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M.
517 [hereinafter Aarhus convention].
15 Svitlana Kravchenko, The Aarhus Convention and Innovations in Compliance
with Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 3
(2007).
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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most international agreements grant rights only to states,16 the Aarhus
Convention provides significant rights to the public, including:
1. The right to access environmental information (Article 4),
coupled with a duty upon each party to collect and disseminate
such information (Article 5).
2. The right to public participation in decisions with
environmental impact:
a. relating to specific environmentally-sensitive activities such
as mineral extraction or refinement (Article 6);
b. concerning plans, programmes and policies relating to the
environment (Article 7); and
c. during the preparation of executive regulations and/or
generally applicable legally binding normative instruments
(Article 8).
3. Access to justice—that is, to independent review of a party's
decisions (Article 9).
In the case of non-compliance by a state party, any member of the
public may make a communication about this to the Convention's
Compliance Committee, which will make a recommendation on the merits
of the case to a full Meeting of the Parties. Meetings of the Compliance
Committee are completely open to the public, and NGOs are readily
accredited to attend Meetings of the Parties.
Article 8 is worth setting out in full. It provides:
Public Participation During the Preparation of . . .
Binding Normative Instruments
Each Party shall strive to promote effective public
participation at an appropriate stage, and while
options are still open, during the preparation by
public authorities of executive regulations and other
generally applicable legally binding rules that may
have a significant effect on the environment. To this
end, the following steps should be taken:

16 However, the first Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights grants individuals direct rights of audience before the Human Rights
Committee of the United Nations in respect of alleged infringements of their rights. See
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S 171. The United States is not a party to this instrument, either.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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a) Time-frames sufficient for effective participation
should be fixed;
b) Draft rules should be published or otherwise
made publicly available; and
c) The public should be given the opportunity to
comment, directly or through representative
consultative bodies.
d) The result of the public participation shall be
taken into account as far as possible.
Substituting ―access to knowledge‖ for ―the environment,‖ the most
ardent opponent of ACTA could hardly ask for more than already exists as
binding international law in the environmental governance regime.
B. Internet Governance
The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), like the Earth
Summit, was a large scale United Nations summit meeting, attended by 175
governments and over 12,000 participants, which resulted in the
development of several agreements: two at the first phase of the meeting
held in Geneva in 2003, and another two at the second phase held in Tunisia
in 2005.
These documents are not treaties, and they do not bind the governments
that agreed to them, still less the private sector and civil society delegates
who contributed their own submissions during the WSIS preparatory
conferences at which the texts were drafted. They are, in other words,
instruments of ―soft‖ rather than ―hard‖ international law.17 Even so,
supported by the large majority of the world's governments, they carry
considerable normative weight within the Internet governance regime.
Of these agreements, those which call for attention here are the Geneva
Declaration of Principles18 from the first phase, and the Tunis Agenda for
the Information Society19 from the second. The Declaration of Principles is

17 See ANTHONY C. AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 24 (1999).
18 See World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva, Switz,, Dec.10-12, 2003,
Geneva Declaration of Principles, U.N. Doc. WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E (Dec. 12,
2003), available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official/dop.html [hereinafter
Geneva Declaration].
19 See World Summit on the Information Society, Tunis, Tunis., Nov. 16-18, 2005,
Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, U.N. Doc. WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev. 1)-E
(Nov. 18, 2005), available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html
[hereinafter Tunis Agenda].
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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based around eleven ―key principles for building an inclusive Information
Society.‖ The first of these concerns the role of governments and all
stakeholders in the promotion of ICTs for development, and provides:
Governments, as well as private sector, civil society
and the United Nations and other international
organizations have an important role and
responsibility in the development of the Information
Society and, as appropriate, in decision-making
processes. Building a people-centred Information
Society is a joint effort which requires cooperation
and partnership among all stakeholders.20
The Declaration goes on to provide that ―international management of
the Internet should be multilateral, transparent and democratic, with the full
involvement of governments, the private sector, civil society and
international organizations,‖21 but—significantly—conditions this with the
proviso that ―Policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues is the
sovereign right of States.‖22
In between the first and second phases of WSIS, a Working Group on
Internet Governance (WGIG) was convened. In its report, it clarified the
content of the regime of governance in which all stakeholders were to
cooperate in partnership, settling on this definition:
Internet governance is the development and application by
Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their
respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decisionmaking procedures, and programmes that shape the
evolution and use of the Internet.23
With this groundwork laid, it fell to the second agreement, the Tunis
Agenda, to address how governments, the private sector and civil society
were to exercise their respective roles in Internet governance. This topic is
addressed in two ways. The first is by calling for the establishment of ―a
process of enhanced cooperation‖ by which governments are to lead the

20 Geneva Declaration, supra note 18, art. 20.
21 Id. art. 48.
22 Id. art. 49(a).
23 World Summit on the Information Society, Report of the Working Group on
Internet Governance, U.N. Doc. WSIS-II/PC-3/DOC/5-E (Aug. 3, 2005), available at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/pc3/html/off5/index.html.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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development of globally applicable public policy principles for the Internet,
in consultation with other stakeholders.24
Since 2005, very little concrete progress had been made towards
establishing this process of enhanced cooperation. But this changed in May
2010 when the Commission for Science and Technology for Development
(CSTD), a committee of the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
tasked with responsibility for following up on the implementation of WSIS,
called upon the Secretary-General to
convene open and inclusive consultations involving
all member states and all other stakeholders to
proceed with the process towards the implementation
of enhanced cooperation in order to enable
governments, on an equal footing to carry out their
roles and responsibilities in international public
policy issues pertaining to the Internet . . . through a
balanced participation of all stakeholders in their
respective roles . . . before the end of 2010.
The second mechanism established at Tunis, which is a part of the
broader process of enhanced cooperation, was the establishment of an
Internet Governance Forum (IGF), as a new venue for multi-stakeholder
policy dialogue in which governments could take an equal role and
responsibility for Internet governance and policy making in consultation
with all other stakeholders.25
The Tunis Agenda states that the IGF should be multilateral, multistakeholder, democratic and transparent in its working and function, with a
lightweight and decentralized structure that is subject to periodic review. It
is not to replace other relevant fora in which Internet governance issues are
discussed or to exercise oversight over them or have any binding decision
making power. In particular, it is to have no involvement in day-to-day or
technical operations of the Internet, but should work in parallel with those
organisations that do, taking advantage of their expertise.26 Its mandate,
inter alia, is to:
a) Discuss public policy issues related to key
elements of Internet governance in order to foster

24 Tunis Agenda, supra note 19, art. 61, 69–71.
25 See id. art. 67–68.
26 See id. art. 73, 77 and 79.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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the sustainability, robustness, security, stability
and development of the Internet.
b) Facilitate discourse between bodies dealing with
different cross-cutting international public
policies regarding the Internet and discuss issues
that do not fall within the scope of any existing
body.
c) Interface with appropriate intergovernmental
organizations and other institutions on matters
under their purview.
…
g) Identify emerging issues, bring them to the
attention of the relevant bodies and the general
public,
and,
where
appropriate,
make
27
recommendations.

The initial five-year term of the IGF winds up in 2010. In his review of
the desirability of the continuation of the IGF, the Secretary-General
observed some deficiencies in its performance to date, as the CSTD had
noted deficiencies in the realisation of the process of enhanced cooperation.
He acknowledged both ―a perception among some civil society stakeholders
that the agenda-setting process of the MAG is not sufficiently inclusive or
transparent,‖ as well as the assessment of many ―that the contribution of the
IGF to public policy-making is difficult to assess and appears to be weak,‖
and made recommendations to address these and other problems.28
Even so, the principles of multi-stakeholder governance laid down in the
Geneva Declaration, and the progress made towards implementing them
through the Internet Governance Forum and the process towards enhanced
cooperation, mark a revolutionary shift away from the hierarchical mode of
intergovernmental rule-making that is still taken for granted in the global
regime for intellectual property rights.
C. Summary of Principles
Two sets of norms have been established, respectively, for the
regimes of environmental and Internet governance, prescribing institutional
principles for civil society access to and participation in policy development
27 Id. art. 72.
28 U. N. Secretary-General, Continuation of the Internet Governance Forum: Note
by the Secretary-General, 8-9, A/65/78- E/2010/68 (May 7, 2010), available at
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan039400.pdf.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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processes. Relevantly, the Aarhus Convention requires policy makers to
provide the public with:
Transparency—or access to information, including draft
rules.
Participation—in decision-making processes at a time when
options are still open.
Recourse—or access to justice in the event that either of the
first two norms is not observed.
The requirements of the Geneva Declaration and the Tunis Agenda of
WSIS are broadly similar, though at a higher level of principle. They
require Internet governance processes to comply with the process criteria
of:
Transparency.
Participation—that is multilateral, democratic and inclusive
of all stakeholders in their respective roles.29
Notably, there is no provision in the WSIS process criteria for the public
to take recourse in the event that their rights to transparency and
participation are not met; instead, the IGF is directed as part of its mandate
to ―Promote and assess, on an ongoing basis, the embodiment of WSIS
principles in Internet governance processes.‖30
The norm of recourse will therefore be set aside for now, both because it
is not common to each of the above regimes, and because in the short term
its proposal as a norm for the intellectual property regime seems overambitious—not least because the United States has made clear that it will
not abide the public having right of action against a state for noncompliance with international law.31
What remains, then, are the norms of transparency and participation
(which could also be called ―access‖).32 On the positive side, these are
general enough to be posited as appropriate guiding principles for global
intellectual property policy development, drawing on the model of the

29 See Geneva Declaration, supra note 18, art. 48; Tunis Agenda, supra note 19, arts.
61, 68, 73.
30 Tunis Agenda, supra note 19, art. 72.
31 See Kravchenko, supra note 15.
32 See Jens Steffek & Patrizia Nanz, Emergent Patterns of Civil Society
Participation in European and Global Governance in CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN
EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1, 10 (Jens Steffek, et al. ed., 2008).
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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environmental and Internet governance regimes. However, they lack
sufficient substantive content to be of much use as standards for assessing
the democratic legitimacy of the negotiation (and later operation) of ACTA.
After all, the ACTA negotiators, implausible as it may sound, have
claimed that they already satisfy or even exceed all appropriate standards of
transparency and participation; stating ―for international trade negotiations
we normally do not have such a democracy [sic] exercise where everybody
can raise their concern,‖33 and even ―This has been an extremely transparent
process.‖34
What is needed therefore are some appropriate metrics of transparency
and participation that can be used for comparison.

III.

METRICS OF TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION

This is easier said than done, in that there is no cookie-cutter template of
structures and procedures that policy-making institutions can apply to
support transparency and participation. So much depends on the purpose of
the organization, its composition, and the type of role it plays in
governance; for example, does it have a policy setting role in its own right,
or a role of advocacy directed towards policy makers elsewhere, or does it
simply coordinate the activities of its constituents—or some combination?35
Despite the difficulty of applying absolute standards to such diverse
governance institutions, there have been scholarly efforts to develop
checklists of criteria that can be applied to rate transparency and the
openness to participation in a quantitative fashion. One such study of
transparency and the democratic deficit of global institutions identified no
fewer than twenty-seven criteria, grouped into four categories—public
access, internal governance, member conduct and accountability. 36
Another study, looking at civil society participation in global
governance institutions, found that such participation could be facilitated in
at least five ways:
1. Making special institutional arrangements for civil society
consultation; such as joint workshops, seminars or public

33 Emert, supra note 5.
34 Masnick, supra note 4.
35 See Jens Martens, Multistakeholder Partnerships: Future Models of
Multilateralism? in DIALOGUE ON GLOBALIZATION 21 (Jan. 2007), available at
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/04244.pdf.
36 See Chris Skelcher, Navdeep Mathur & Mike Smith, The Public Governance of
Collaborative Spaces: Discourse, Design and Democracy, 83 PUB. ADMIN. 584 (2005).
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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2.
3.
4.

5.

symposia.
Allowing NGOs to submit their own documentation to the
international organization.
Allowing NGOs to attend their intergovernmental political
meetings as observers.
Allowing NGOs to intervene actively in the
intergovernmental process of policy deliberation and address
delegates directly.
Allowing NGOs to put topics for future deliberation onto the
organization's agenda.37

The present paper will take a simpler approach, similar to that already
taken above when drawing out the two broad principles of transparency and
participation from the regimes of environmental and Internet governance.
In this case, however, we will look within the regime of intellectual
property policy making, to draw out some specific best practices related to
transparency and participation, from other institutions in that regime.
A. Intellectual Property Policy Institutions
The institutions selected for analysis here38 are:
WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization). As the
intergovernmental organization that administers the major
global treaties on copyright and related rights (the Berne and
Rome Conventions39 and the WIPO Internet Treaties40) as
well as on patents and trademarks (the Paris Convention),41

37 Steffek, supra note 32, at 13.
38 Of course, this list is not complete. Amongst the other institutions that could have
been included are ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, which
sets domain name policy and has a large contingent of trade mark owners amongst its
stakeholders), the Council of Europe (whose work in promoting human rights is relevant to
issues of intellectual property enforcement), the WHO (World Health Organization, which
is required to deal with pharmaceutical patent issues), UNESCO (United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which has been a venue for debates over
―communications rights‖) and the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme, which
promotes the use of open source software for development).
39 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sep. 9,
1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30; Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, 26 Oct. 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43.
40 See WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76;
WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65.
41 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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WIPO is perhaps the central international actor in the
regime.
WTO (World Trade Organization). The WTO administers
the TRIPS agreement,42 which largely incorporates the
substantive content of the WIPO-administered conventions,
except that it allows signatories to seek redress against each
other for the breach of the agreement through the WTO's
dispute resolution process.
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development). The OECD differs from WIPO and the WTO
in that it concludes few ―hard law‖ treaties amongst its 32
member countries, but more ―soft law‖ instruments such as
recommendations and standards. Its work on intellectual
property rights is of this kind.43
CSTD (Commission on Science and Technology for
Development). The CSTD has already been mentioned with
respect to its role of coordinating the system-wide follow-up
on WSIS, including action lines on intellectual property
issues.44 It also does not have a role in producing ―hard
law,‖ but simply advises the UN General Assembly and
ECOSOC.
IGF (Internet Governance Forum). Although formed under
the auspices of the United Nations pursuant to an
intergovernmental compact at WSIS, the IGF is a multistakeholder body, with governments and civil society
participants possessing equal formal status. It is not
specifically mandated to deal with intellectual property
issues,45 but has done so in practice.

42 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197.
43 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
COMPENDIUM OF OECD WORK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (IP), (2007), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/61/34305040.pdf.
44 Notably under the third action line on ―Access to information and knowledge.‖
See World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva Plan of Action, U.N. Doc. WSIS04/GENEVA/DOC/5-E (Dec. 12, 2003), available at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official/poa.html#c3.
45 See JEREMY MALCOLM, MULTI-STAKEHOLDER GOVERNANCE AND THE INTERNET
GOVERNANCE FORUM 71 (2008).
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The following table summarizes some of the most significant strengths
and weaknesses of each of these institutions with respect to their
transparency and the opportunities that they provide for civil society to
participate in their processes.46
Organization
WIPO

WTO

OECD

CSTD

Transparency

Participation

Strengths
Weaknesses
Strengths
Weaknesses
Distributes both Not pro-active in Ready
NGO input comes
official
disseminating
accreditation of last after all
documents and such information NGOs
governments have
negotiating texts
spoken
Distributes
NGOs have
academic studies
speaking and
and reports
submission rights
NGO side
meetings
facilitated
Distributes
Most negotiating Ministerial
No NGO access to
official
texts not formally Conference open TRIPS Council
documents
released
to NGO observers meetings
NGO position
No distribution of
papers posted
NGO documents
online
at meetings
NGO side
Generally no
meetings at
speaking rights for
Ministerial
NGOs
Conference
Most documents Poor
Permanent
Structure excludes
published openly transparency of advisory
developing
hard law
committee,
countries
negotiations
CSISAC
Ministerial
Meeting open to
NGO observers
All documents
Negotiation texts Ready
NGO input comes
published openly made available, accreditation of last after all
but not online
NGOs
governments have
spoken

46 More information can be found in a study published by Knowledge Ecology
International, covering a slightly different set of organizations—the WTO, WIPO, WHO,
UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law), Unidroit
(International Institute for the Unification of Private Law), UNCTAD (United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development), OECD and Hague Conference on Private
International Law. The negotiations of five international treaties, within and outside the
UN system are also considered. See Knowledge Ecology International, ACTA is Secret.
How Transparent are Other Global Norm Setting Exercises? (July 21, 2009),
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/4/attachment1_transparency_ustr.pdf; Knowledge
Ecology International, Transparency of negotiating documents in selected fora (July 21,
2009), http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/4/attachment2_transparency_ustr.pdf;
Knowledge Ecology International, Participation by the Public in Selected Negotiations
(July 21, 2009), http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/4/attachment3_transparency_ustr.pdf.
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NGOs have
speaking and
submission rights
All documents
MAG mailing list Open forum, all
published openly is private, with participants
anonymized
formally equal
summaries
NGO side
meetings
facilitated

No official outputs

Weak links
between NGO
input and policy
makers

A few words about each of the institutions in this table are in order.
Probably the least transparent and participatory body shown here is the
WTO, which although having improved its documentary transparency in
recent years, remains notorious for its limited engagement with civil
society,47 and for its exclusion of developing countries from the closed-door
―green room‖ negotiations it hosts.
WIPO fares better, in that it allows accredited NGO representatives into
all its plenary negotiating sessions (though there are, as in the WTO, also
closed-door sessions between country blocs). However, the interaction
between NGOs and governments is stilted at best, because civil society
interventions are left until last, and the time given for them is strictly
limited. Moreover, that time must be shared with interventions from
business groups, which WIPO also classes as ―NGOs.‖
The OECD takes a different approach to WIPO, in that rather than
granting NGOs observer status at intergovernmental meetings, it has
established a dedicated body, the CSISAC (Civil Society Information
Society Advisory Council) to contribute to its policy work.48 On the other
hand, when the OECD has negotiated hard law agreements, notably a failed
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, its transparency and openness to
participation have been much poorer.49
The CSTD, like the other organizations considered so far, is
intergovernmental in structure. However, it was mandated at WSIS to
conduct its follow-up activities using a ―multi-stakeholder approach,‖50 and
as such, has followed a practice of allowing NGOs to actively observe its

47 See Ngaire Woods & Amrita Narlikar, Governance and the Limits of
Accountability: The WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank, 53 INT'L SOC. SCI. J. 505, 580
(2001).
48 See Civil Society Information Society Advisory Council, http://csisac.org/ (last
visited Sep. 10, 2010).
49 See Katia Tieleman, The Failure of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MAI) and the Absence of a Global Policy Policy Network, Global Public Policy Institute
(April 10, 2000), http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/Tieleman_MAI_GPP_Network.pdf.
50 Tunis Agenda, supra note 19, art.105.
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proceedings. Whilst it is similar in this respect to WIPO, it does not have
the same ―hard power‖ that WIPO does, being limited to a role of making
recommendations only.
Finally the IGF is the most open of any of the bodies considered here, in
that civil society participates at IGF meetings in a position of equality with
governmental and private sector representatives. It is at least as transparent
as any of the other institutions considered—though not completely so, as its
Multi-stakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) meets in private. Even so, for
all its formal openness, the civil society's actual influence at the IGF on the
development of intellectual property policy is very limited, largely because
the IGF has yet shied away from its mandate to produce
recommendations,51 and failed to develop links to other institutions that
would allow policy makers to take such recommendations into account.52
In this context, recall that the Aarhus Convention requires not only that
policy development processes be open to participation, but also that ―[t]he
result of the public participation . . . be taken into account as far as
possible.‖ As even the UN Secretary-General has observed, the IGF has not
yet developed the structures or processes by which for this to occur.53
B. Summary of Best Practices
Having progressed from the generality of the Aarhus and WSIS
principles on transparency and public participation in governance to the
more specific structures and processes of the existing institutions of the
intellectual property regime, it is possible to draw out some best practices.
This does not mean that the existing institutions are the best they could be.
On the contrary, if the institutions of the intellectual property regime are to
be assessed against the principles of transparency and participation we
derived earlier, each such institution has considerable room for
improvement. (This even extends to the IGF, notwithstanding that it was an
outcome of the WSIS process.)
Having said this, some best practices are already in place. Taking
transparency, there is no longer much room for argument about the
appropriate content of this norm. Even the WTO, the least participatory of
the organizations studied, posts all of its official documents online, and
most of the other institutions also make available negotiating texts. Adding
to this, most of those institutions (especially WIPO, the OECD and the IGF)

51 See id. art. 72(g).
52 Malcolm, supra note 45, at 513-521.
53 See U. N. Secretary-General, supra note 28.
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also freely provide background materials and studies, as well as briefing
sessions on their policy activities. Thus, it can be confidently posited that
these are the basic best practices for transparency of governance in the
intellectual property regime.
As for participation, more variance can be seen, but there are four main
options amongst the institutions considered here:
1. A ―passive‖ observer role, in which opportunities for
speaking with delegates and distributing documents are
limited (as at the WTO Ministerial Conference).
2. An ―active‖ observer role, in which NGO representatives can
more directly interact with delegates and distribute
documents (as at WIPO and the CSTD).
3. Formal permanent advisory groups, providing a defined
pathway for input from civil society on all policy proposals
(such as the OECD's CSISAC).
4. A multi-stakeholder governance structure that affords
governmental and civil society delegates a position of
equality (as at the IGF).
An important observation to be made here is that in general, an inverse
relationship exists between the openness to participation of an organization,
and the degree of ―legalization‖54 or ―hardness‖ of its output. In other
words, the institutions that produce hard law (the WTO and WIPO) tend to
be more closed than those that produce soft law (the OECD and CSTD),
with the IGF—which doesn't even yet produce recommendations—being
the most open of all, but to the least advantage of civil society. Therefore,
in considering best practices on participation, we must make practical
allowance for the fact that governments will not be inclined to grant civil
society free rein within institutions that have the power to conclude hard or
binding law. Even so, options 2 and 3 above can still be considered
possible best practices for institutions of any character within the
intellectual property regime.
This leads to the question, how does ACTA stack up against these
principles and best practices?

IV.

ACTA

54 See Kenneth W Abbot, et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401
(2000).
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Before attempting to answer this, it must be understood that ACTA
actually represents two, quite separate, institutions. The first is the group of
countries that is (at the time of writing) negotiating the text of the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement itself, at a series of closed meetings around
the world.
The second, and perhaps ultimately more important institution is the
multilateral treaty organization that will come into being once the ACTA
negotiations are concluded and the agreement is signed.55 This organization
will comprise of an ACTA Committee constituted by each of the
signatories, and possibly further ad hoc committees and working groups
that the Committee may establish.56
The transparency and participatory openness of ACTA will therefore be
considered first in relation to the negotiation phase of ACTA, and then with
respect to the ACTA Committee and any sub-groups.
A. Negotiation Phase
Beginning with the transparency of the negotiation phase, the best
practices established above would require:
Access to the negotiation texts, before and after each round
of negotiation, as is the practice at WIPO. Instead, there has
only been one official release of text in April 2010,57
following the Wellington round of talks, which occurred
only after five years of closed-door negotiations and in the
wake of the full text being leaked in March.58
Institutionalized and regular briefing sessions to civil

55 These comments are based on the latest full text of ACTA available at the time of
writing (August 17, 2010), which is the leaked version from the July 2010 round of
negotiations in Lucerne. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Informal
Predecisional/Deliberative Draft: July. 1, 2010, PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT DATABASE,
http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow ―Full Leaked Text Dated July 1,
2010‖ hyperlink) [hereinafter ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010].
56 See ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 55, art. 5.1(1), (3)(a).
57 See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Informal Predecisional/Deliberative
Draft: April 21, 2010, PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT DATABASE,
http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow ―Official Consolidated ACTA Text
Prepared for Public Release, April 21, 2010‖ hyperlink) [hereinafter ACTA Draft – April
21, 2010].
58 See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Informal Predecisional/Deliberative
Draft: Jan. 18, 2010, PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT DATABASE,
http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow ―Full Leaked Text Dated Jan. 18,
2010‖ hyperlink) [hereinafter ACTA Draft – Jan. 18, 2010].
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society, such as those conducted by WIPO59 and the
OECD.60 Instead, the only briefing sessions held have been
those that some of the negotiating parties have chosen to
hold in their own countries, on an irregular and ad hoc basis.
Coordinated and regular release of background materials on
the negotiations, such as those released by the IGF before
each of its meetings.61 In fact only one joint fact sheet has
been produced, in March 2010, with some of the negotiating
parties having sporadically released other materials.62
Such materials must also be disseminated to the public. Short
of doing so actively through a public relations office, a
minimum requirement met by all the other institutions
analyzed is the use of a central institutional Web site. No
such thing exists for ACTA. Rather, what few materials have
been released have been disseminated mainly by civil
society, and through Web sites of some of the negotiating
governments.63

Thus ACTA meets none of the basic best practices for transparency of
the existing institutions of the intellectual property policy regime.
The provision made for public participation in the ACTA negotiations is
no better. Based on the model established by the other institutions
examined here, civil society is entitled to expect:
Access to the negotiation venue, through a lightweight

59 See WIPO Information Meeting on Intellectual Property Financing, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/2009/ip_fin_ge_09/index.html (last visited Sep. 10, 2010)
(describing a recent open informational meeting on intellectual property financing).
60 An OECD Forum, open to the public, is held in conjunction with the annual
Ministerial Meeting. SeeOECD Forum, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_34493_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited
Sep. 10, 2010).
61 INTERNET GOVERNANCE FORUM, IGF, PROGRAMME FOR THE 2010 MEETING, JULY
15, 2010 (2010), available at
http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/2010/ProgrammePaper.15.07.2010.v2.doc.
62 For one such document distributed in South Korea, see ANTI-COUNTERFEITING
TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) FACT SHEET (March 25, 2010),
http://www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/hbd/hbdread.jsp?typeID=6&boardid=10252
&seqno=327174 (last visited Sep. 10, 2010).
63 Australia has published information on its government site. See AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) – Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/acta/ (last visited Sep 11, 2010).
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accreditation process, and the ability to observe the
proceedings. No such provision has been made for any of
the ACTA negotiation rounds. Indeed, even the location of
the venue of most of the rounds has been kept secret.

Rights for NGO representatives to speak to the negotiating assembly
and to submit documents, as for example is the case at WIPO. Needless to
say, in view of the failure to even grant access to the negotiation venue,
these rights have not been afforded. Some of the negotiating parties have
conducted their own consultation processes at a national or regional level.64
B. Implementation Phase
Once ACTA has been concluded and signed, amongst the powers of the
ACTA Committee will be:
To set its own rules and procedures.65
To consider any amendments to the Agreement.66
To make recommendations regarding implementation and
operation of the Agreement, including endorsing best
practice guidelines relating thereto.67
To share information and best practices on reducing
intellectual property rights infringements, including
techniques for identifying and monitoring piracy and
counterfeiting.68
Transparency and participation are no less important to civil society in
respect of these ongoing policy setting and coordination activities as they
have been in respect of the negotiation of the original Agreement.
In this context, the following points describe the transparency that civil
society is entitled to expect from ACTA, based on the best practices
identified from other institutions in the intellectual property policy regime:
All official documents of the ACTA Committee should be
openly published, as are similar documents from all the other

64
65
66
67
68

See Ermert, supra note 5 (describing a 2009 European consultation meeting).
See ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 55, art.5.1(4).
Id. art.5.1(2)(c) 6.4.
Id. art.5.1(3)(c).
Id. art.5.1(3)(d).
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institutions studied in this paper. These will include the
rules, procedures, recommendations and best practice
guidelines described above, as well as proposed amendments
to the Agreement. Whether such documents will in fact be
openly released is yet unknown, as the ACTA text is silent
on this point.
Additionally, negotiating drafts of the above should be
released, to borrow a phrase from the Aarhus Convention,
―at an appropriate stage, and while options are still open.‖69
Again, we do not know whether this will be the case (but
might reasonably guess, from the conduct of the ACTA
negotiations to date, that it will not be).
The domestic implementation of ACTA by its members
should also be transparent. On this count, the draft ACTA
text does actually have something to say—though we do not
yet know exactly what, as the current draft of the agreement
contains two alternative sets of provisions.70 In general,
however, it will probably require national laws, procedures
and judicial decisions on IP enforcement to be published
openly.

Thus, the standard of transparency that civil society can expect from
ACTA into the future can best be described as unknown. As to its
expectations of participation in the operation of ACTA:
If it is too much to expect that NGOs should be able to join
the ACTA Committee as members, following the model of
the IGF, then it should at least be possible for delegations to
appoint NGO advisors to attend Committee meetings with
them. In fact, wording in the officially released draft text did
accommodate this.71 However, this has been removed from
the current draft.
There should be a simple and accessible procedure for NGOs
to seek accreditation to attend the meetings of the ACTA
Committee as active observers. At present, this is not
69 See Aarhus convention, supra note 14, art.8.
70 See ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 55, art.4.3.
71 See ACTA Draft – April 21, 2010, supra note 57, art 5.5(1).
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guaranteed. A specific provision of the earlier public draft
that would have allowed the Committee to invite
―international organizations active in the field of intellectual
property and . . . non-governmental groups of intellectual
property stakeholders‖ to attend sessions ―or parts thereof.‖72
Whilst this provision was inadequate, in that it arguably left
it for the Committee to take the initiative to extend such an
invitation, even this weak provision has since been removed.
Civil society should be consulted by the Committee in
discussions over the amendment and development of the
Agreement, the drafting of rules, procedures,
recommendations and best practice guidelines, and ―any
other matter that may affect the implementation and
operation of this Agreement.‖73 This could best be done
through a permanent civil society advisory committee such
as the OECD's CSISAC, or the IGF's (multi-stakeholder, in
that case) MAG. Another option is the establishment of a
dedicated civil society liaison office similar to the External
Relations offices of WIPO and the WTO. However, in either
case, no such provisions exist. The draft only specifies that
the Committee may (not shall) ―seek the advice of nongovernmental persons or groups.‖74

The future scope for civil society participation in the activities of ACTA
is therefore unknown at best and nonexistent at worst. Certainly, civil
society can gain no comfort from the current draft text that its interests will
be observed, and has every reason to suspect otherwise from the conduct of
the present ACTA negotiations.
Thus in sum, considering both the negotiation and implementation
stages, ACTA fails to comply with the basic norms and best practices of
transparency and participation that have been established by other
institutions in the intellectual property policy regime. Such an institution
lacks democratic legitimacy as an actor in the regime, and this will
inevitably impact upon its perceived authority by other actors and upon
compliance with the norms it promulgates.75

72 Id. art 5.6.
73 ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 55, art.5.1(2)(e).
74 Id. art.5.1(3)(b).
75 See generally THOMAS M FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS
16 (1990).
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V.

CONCLUSION

Strict intergovernmentalism remains unchallenged as the model for
development of global public policy on intellectual property issues. But in
other regimes of governance, this is no longer the case. This paper
described the regime of international environmental law, in which the
Aarhus Convention requires its members to uphold the principles of
transparency of information, public participation in decision-making, and
the provision of access to justice. It also described the Internet governance
regime, in which the process criteria established at WSIS call upon
institutions of Internet governance to act in a manner that is multilateral,
transparent and democratic, with the full involvement of all stakeholders in
their respective roles.
The global regime for intellectual property rights raises transnational
public policy issues of no lesser importance than those raised by the
environmental and Internet governance regimes, yet it lacks similar broad
principles to guide its institutions in designing structures and processes that
support public interest representation.
There are signs that this is changing. For example, the WIPO
Development Agenda directs that the organization's norm-setting activities
―be a participatory process, which takes into consideration the interests and
priorities of all WIPO Member States and the viewpoints of other
stakeholders, including accredited inter-governmental organizations (IGOs)
and NGOs,‖76 and pledges ―[t]o enhance measures that ensure wide
participation of civil society at large in WIPO activities in accordance with
its criteria regarding NGO acceptance and accreditation, keeping the issue
under review.‖
But more is needed, and the principles established must apply to all
actors in the regime, not only one. Ultimately, such principles should come
in the shape of a framework convention,77 or at least an intergovernmental
summit document such as the Geneva Statement of Principles from WSIS.
But in the meantime, civil society including academia, and perhaps in
cooperation with supportive private sector actors and governments, could
begin to develop a statement of such principles independently.
76 World Intellectual Property Organization, The 45 Adopted Recommendations
under the WIPO Development Agenda, art. 15, 42 (Oct. 3, 2007),
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-development/en/agenda/recommendations.pdf.
77 See John Mathiason, A Framework Convention: An Institutional Option for
Internet Governance, THE INTERNET GOVERNANCE PROJECT (Dec. 20, 2004),
http://www.internetgovernance.org/pdf/igp-fc.pdf.
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For the Internet governance regime (which already starts from a
stronger base, in the WSIS process criteria), there exists such a project to
develop a code of good practice on information, participation and
transparency.78 The code is a joint project of the Council of Europe,
Association for Progressive Communications (APC) and the UNECE (not
coincidentally, the host body of the Aarhus Convention).
The absence of anything similar for the global intellectual property
rights regime makes it more difficult for civil society to normatively
challenge the legitimacy of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement,
which has failed to meet the public's expectations during its negotiation
phase, and seems unlikely to do better once it has been agreed. Even so, it
has been possible in this short paper to demonstrate ACTA's flagrant
neglect of basic principles of transparency and public participation, which
were drawn from other regimes but which are supported by best practices in
existing intellectual property policy institutions.
It now falls to civil society, in the short term, to continue to lobby for
the inclusion of better structures and processes for public interest
representation in ACTA, both during its negotiation phase and in the
institution that is formed once it is agreed. These will include the
institutionalization of access to information, and measures for public
representation through active observation and/or a permanent civil society
advisory committee.
In the longer term, it is necessary to advocate for the development and
promulgation of general principles of transparency and participation against
which not only ACTA, but all other actors in the intellectual property
regime can be judged.

78 See Council of Europe et al., Code of Good Practice on Information, Participation
and Transparency in Internet Governance (June 2010),
http://www.intgovcode.org/images/c/c1/COGP_IG_Version_1.1_June2010.pdf.
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